Thwart fraud
Train teams to recognise phishing, impersonation and CEO fraud.
Why this programme
Fraud targets people first, not systems. Fake adviser, fake supplier, fake executive: the projected scenarios reproduce the attempts your institution actually faces. Teams learn to be suspicious at the right moment, and know whom to alert.
What your teams experience
- True or false: sort reconstructed emails, text messages and calls, legitimate or fraudulent, against the clock.
- The CEO call: one team receives an urgent transfer request and must decide, under pressure, what to do next.
- The alert chain: put the right people to alert back in order when a doubt arises.
- The trap board: the screen reveals the clues each team spotted, and those it missed.
Each activity opens and closes with a projected cinematic sequence, personalised for your teams. The facilitator sets the pace: nothing moves forward without them.
What the company gains
Fewer clicks on malicious links, faster reporting, and a culture where questioning an unusual request becomes a valued reflex.
The global average cost of a data breach reached a record USD 4.99 million, up 12% over last year.
Staging written for you
In your client area, a form specific to this programme collects your content: it is built into the challenges and cinematic sequences, exactly as you provide it. The look uses your logo and your colours. Teams are formed on the spot or based on your organisation chart.
Follow-up, up to D+30
Your follow-up dashboard stays with the programme, from the order to the final results.
- After the session: the session report, with the gap between the opening and closing measures.
- At D+7: a reminder asks a few key questions again, and the D+7 report shows what has been retained.
- At D+30: a second reminder, and the D+30 report shows what holds over time.
The sources of this programme
The published research that this programme's games, measures and debriefs refer to. You can check every reference.
- Vishwanath, A., Herath, T., Chen, R., Wang, J., & Rao, H. R. (2011). Why do people get phished? Decision Support Systems, 51(3), 576-586. 10.1016/j.dss.2011.03.002
- Workman, M. (2008). Wisecrackers: A theory-grounded investigation of phishing and pretext social engineering threats to information security. JASIST, 59(4), 662-674. 10.1002/asi.20779
- Stajano, F., & Wilson, P. (2011). Understanding scam victims: Seven principles for systems security. Communications of the ACM, 54(3), 70-75. 10.1145/1897852.1897872
- Kumaraguru, P., Sheng, S., Acquisti, A., Cranor, L. F., & Hong, J. (2010). Teaching Johnny not to fall for phish. ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, 10(2), 1-31. 10.1145/1754393.1754396
- Lain, D., Kostiainen, K., & Čapkun, S. (2022). Phishing in organizations: Findings from a large-scale and long-term study. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 842-859. 10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833766
- Ho, G., Mirian, A., Luo, E., Tong, K., Lee, E., Liu, L., Longhurst, C. A., Dameff, C., Savage, S., & Voelker, G. M. (2025). Understanding the efficacy of phishing training in practice. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 37-54. 10.1109/sp61157.2025.00076
- Edmondson, A. (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), 350-383. 10.2307/2666999
- Stasser, G., & Titus, W. (1985). Pooling of unshared information in group decision making. JPSP, 48(6), 1467-1478. 10.1037/0022-3514.48.6.1467
- Gollwitzer, P. M., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Implementation intentions and goal achievement. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 69-119. 10.1016/S0065-2601(06)38002-1
- Roediger, H. L., & Karpicke, J. D. (2006). Test-enhanced learning. Psychological Science, 17(3), 249-255. 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01693.x
- Howard, G. S. (1980). Response-shift bias. Evaluation Review, 4(1), 93-106. 10.1177/0193841X8000400105
- ACFE (2024). Occupational Fraud 2024: A Report to the Nations. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (rapport). legacy.acfe.com/report-to-the-nations/2024/
Further reading (2 references)
Other research we drew on to design this programme.
- Dhamija, R., Tygar, J. D., & Hearst, M. (2006). Why phishing works. Proceedings of CHI 2006, 581-590. 10.1145/1124772.1124861
- Jensen, M. L., Dinger, M., Wright, R. T., & Thatcher, J. B. (2017). Training to mitigate phishing attacks using mindfulness techniques. Journal of Management Information Systems, 34(2), 597-626. 10.1080/07421222.2017.1334499
Shared foundations (11 references)
The mechanics of all our sessions (team play, the debrief, the before-and-after measure, spaced reminders) and the research that also underpins the other programmes in the same specialty or sector.
- Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2005). Can businesses effectively regulate employee conduct? The antecedents of rule following in work settings. Academy of Management Journal, 48(6), 1143-1158. 10.5465/amj.2005.19573114
- Treviño, L. K., Weaver, G. R., Gibson, D. G., & Toffler, B. L. (1999). Managing ethics and legal compliance: What works and what hurts. California Management Review, 41(2), 131-151. 10.2307/41165990
- Weaver, G. R., & Treviño, L. K. (1999). Compliance and values oriented ethics programs: Influences on employees' attitudes and behavior. Business Ethics Quarterly, 9(2), 315-335. 10.2307/3857477
- Kish-Gephart, J. J., Harrison, D. A., & Treviño, L. K. (2010). Bad apples, bad cases, and bad barrels. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95(1), 1-31. 10.1037/a0017103
- Parker, C., & Nielsen, V. L. (2009). Corporate compliance systems: Could they make any difference? Administration & Society, 41(1), 3-37. 10.1177/0095399708328869
- Verhage, A. (2009). Compliance and AML in Belgium: A booming sector with growing pains. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 12(2), 113-133. 10.1108/13685200910951893
- Takáts, E. (2011). A theory of "crying wolf": The economics of money laundering enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 27(1), 32-78. 10.1093/jleo/ewp018
- Morrison, E. W., & Milliken, F. J. (2000). Organizational silence. Academy of Management Review, 25(4), 706-725. 10.5465/amr.2000.3707697
- Sitzmann, T. (2011). A meta-analytic examination of the instructional effectiveness of computer-based simulation games. Personnel Psychology, 64(2), 489-528. 10.1111/j.1744-6570.2011.01190.x
- Butler, A. C., & Roediger, H. L. (2008). Feedback enhances the positive effects and reduces the negative effects of multiple-choice testing. Memory & Cognition, 36(3), 604-616. 10.3758/MC.36.3.604
- Cepeda, N. J., Pashler, H., Vul, E., Wixted, J. T., & Rohrer, D. (2006). Distributed practice in verbal recall tasks. Psychological Bulletin, 132(3), 354-380. 10.1037/0033-2909.132.3.354
Before you book
How is a Corporate Solutions experience different from team building?
It starts from a business objective, not an activity: onboarding new hires, preventing a risk, bringing your commitments to life. It is staged for your company, with your content, your figures and your brand. Your teams play in person, on their phones, while a big screen tells the story and a facilitator runs the room. And it is followed up: the session report, then the D+7 and D+30 reminders in your client area.
Do we need to install an app?
No. Participants scan a QR code and play in their phone's browser. No account, no password, no installation. It works on iPhone and Android.
Is there a limit on the number of participants?
No. The platform adapts to your headcount, from a small team to the whole company, in one or several rooms.